It's LE!

Oh, and this topic is cool too.

Up and running. Now everytime I click on the IP detection site, it comes up with a different address.

But correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't the SG server wig out if you sign in from too many different IP addresses in a set time period?

[Edited on Dec 23, 2004 by Keith]

Most useful news topic on SG ever.

As far as I understand it, it sounds like a distributed proxy. ok, neat.

But, suppose Alice starts downloading some kiddie porn. In the server logs, it'll look like bob, carol, dave, eva, isaac, ivan, justin and mallory are all downloading chunks of the kiddie porn, which ultimately get sent to Alice-the-pedo.

Even if bob-through-mallory don't *know* they're doing something illegal/immoral the FBI/authorities/etc could charge them with trafficing child pornography, all the same. I doubt the US legal system will allow people using Tor to hide behind mommy-common-carrier's apron so as to avoid the repercussions of distributing illegal content.

But, then again, I've been drinking.

Yeah stavrogin that sounds about right. AT&T Research has something similar that I found out about a couple years ago called Crowds. I didn't use it for this specific reason.

s5 - is Keith's conjecture about SG not liking a wildly dynamic IP correct?

Ok, cool. Thanks.

(I assume that a cookie or somesuch allows for the continous login?)

Edited as I see that LE already answered my question. Thanks all!

[Edited on Dec 23, 2004 by slimjim]

Uhmm... hasn't this already been done with FreeNET?
I mean it's been a while since I used read the literature on FreeNET so can someone fill in the details?

Freenet's structure is completely different. Content on the Freenet network doesn't reside at any specific place; it spreads depending on node specialization and the demand for the material. The system is designed so that it's impossible to tell what any particular node has in its datastore (even by the person running it) and so that it's impossible to tell which node actually initiated the request (each one appears to only be forwarding a request for another node). Both of these elements are designed to make the system censorship-resistant and build in an element of plausible deniability.

Systems like Tor and JAP (which supports Tor nodes in its development branch, BTW) work on a different principle -- basically, they're extensions of the proxy chain idea, with some randomization built in. Freenet's architecture and goals are different. A better comparison would be with I2P, which is like a cross between the two.

Alice needs a stern talking to (or a good slap).

This kind of misuse, inevitable possible with an anonymous communication system, is a big concern to the well-intentioned Tor people. Their Tor design doc,as well as mentioning their goal of bulding a reputation for privacy, human rights, research, and other socially laudable activities, notes that 'Preventing abuse..will probably remain an arms race for the forseeable future'). However, a good start is the fact that an OR (Onion Router) at the end of a chain can set its own exit policy to limit the types of traffic (and presumably destinations, - e.g. known kiddy porn IP sites) it allows to leave.

'Course, the more you allow people to filter the output, the more you're potentially undermining any anti-censorship goals of a a project. D'oh!

Thanks to the onion encryption and the fact that each OR (Onion Router) only knows its predecessor & successor in the OR circuit, it'd be damn difficult to prove what traffic was passing over an OR in the middle of a circuit, though the traffic at each end would usually be unencrypted and sniffable. End-sniffing can be avoided [narf] if the user and end-server are running their traffic through ORs they control. Add the fact that an OR chain would probably pass through many legal jurisdications around the globe and the usual common traffic-carrier arguments will complicate prosecuting OR operators.

(Though there is a statement somewhere in the Tor literature that OR operators might need the balls to stand up to strong pressure too!)


[Edited on Jan 06, 2005 1:21AM]

Well, for secure end point oriented transmission I met these guys a bit ago and for the email / IM / P2P I'd rather run through their solution.

The OR is novel but has some fundimental issues like if your first hop is your ISP and people are watching everything on your wire from your modem to the first hop, it does fuck all. When the FBI gets a trap order, they can sit in that exact position.

I imagine the drvelopers of Tor will eventually aim at solving this, maybe some PKI based secure ISP software.

There are some other known-associate Patriot act troubles having to do with computer siezures that are very easy to pull under this auspice, but I am tired. If anyone really wants to know about it say so and I'll rehash why using encryption can get your computer jacked at the drop of a hat under the auspices of National Security.