I was looking through papers I wrote during grad school and came across this one; one of my first. I thought I'd share it here. Let me know what you think.
HE LOVES ME...HE LOVES ME NOT: The two sides of Spinoza’s friendship
Friendship, the most noble of human pursuits. It brings out the best in individuals; it compels us to actions that perhaps if in isolation we would not perform. We are drawn outside of ourselves; we act, for one reason or another, for a purpose greater than one’s own isolated self—men are joined through friendship by mutual beneficence; this is the power of this most precious virtue. Depending upon ‘this reason or another’ we get a very different flavor for human interaction via friendship. So needless to say then, how a philosopher deals with the topic of friendship reveals much about their ethical and political theory. If, for example, friendship is based in egoism, there is more than a hint of utility. And although the individual is certainly drawn into the community, his investment is limited. He will only act if he believes that he will be benefited more than the Friend. His individualism does not allow room for generosity and true gratitude; moreover, he distrusts those bonds by which men cleave themselves, believing the Friend is out simply for himself; thus undercutting friendship altogether. On the other hand, if a philosopher believes in a universal, national brotherhood—a friendship based on altruism—not only is he is looked upon as being naïve, but this view tends to undercut the importance of the self in friendship as well. One can actual end up harming oneself, in the name of ‘the greater glory’ of the whole. This result can often bring with it resentment, albeit in some cases unconscious, but damaging nevertheless, again undercutting the bonds by which friendship is supposed to bestow. This inadequacy, which lies at the root of modern philosophy is unfortunate, since friendship and philosophy cannot be separated. Philosophical discourse must be done within a friendly conversion, if it is to be done at all. For it allows for a free exchange of ideas, while still being critical of inaccurate thinking, making a community of like minded individuals, whose aim it is to benefit only oneself but the whole as well, and not only the whole but the self at the same time. Instead of either egoism or altruism, true friendship must be gained through reciprocity; reciprocity, here, being understood as a condition of mutual-growth and understanding. If philosophy is taken in its most fundamental state as self-understanding, the marriage between philosophy and friendship indicates that with friendship there comes a mutual self-understanding. Friendship is the vessel by which philosophy as self-understanding reaches its greatest heights. Only by appreciating the Friend can one truly understand who one is and how one should live. This is the true prize of friendship, ethical pedagogy; when one is able to find an alternative between egoism and altruism, the Friend draws one into a true community and through this, acts as a mirror developing in the individual a conscience. Let us now turn to how Spinoza addresses this difficult and yet fruitful subject. Either of the branches posed by modern philosophy concerning friendship, Spinoza considers to be imaginative; i.e., friendship as understood through the level of the imagination. Since we all begin at said level, it should not a surprise why friendship has been articulated in the modern times in this manner. But beginning at such a level forces us to ask the question, how, according to Spinoza, does one move beyond the imagination and recognize the Friend truly, especially since we are by nature disposed to hate and envy (EIIIp55S). This is the question that the paper will explore: through social interaction and human-being’s disposition towards self-perseveration, how can true friendship naturally arise? Due to the already lengthy, yet required treatment of the text, much of the buttressing argument has been placed in footnotes. Please view these as they will illuminate the paper’s arguments. The subject of friendship [amicitia] lies at the heart of Spinoza’s philosophy. Not only is amicitia a key component, indeed the defining characteristic of generositas—one of two strengths of character [fortitude] (the active virtues) but amicitia also makes possible the harmonious bonds necessary for living in a community (EIVpp31-37, pp70-73). It lays out the possibility for these conditions, since insofar as individuals live according to reason, they are most like each other and most individuals agree in being (EIVp35), guided, as it were, by one mind (TP ch.2.16). Moreover, amicitia allows for each individual to live in an environment that is safer than if they lived on their own (EIVp18Sii, p73). Existing in a community allows the individual the opportunity to enjoy life more than if he simply lived in the volatile state of nature, culminating in understanding of himself, God, and things. Only in a community does the individual have the ability to experience the active affects such as, cheerfulness, gladness, and ultimately happiness; only in the community is an individual able to live fully enough to contemplate the richness of the human experience. Thus, the individual is able to express his power of being to the fullest extent, and thus to live most fully. This expression is strengthened only in a true community due to the imitation of affects; the more one sees others living in the same manner as oneself, one’s idea of himself and his way of life are strengthened. Yet, Spinoza seems to problematize friendship by arguing simultaneously for both senses of amicitia. On the one hand, amicitia signifies a self-involved life, one in which one is concerned for oneself (see especially EIIIp6-7, EIVp20-22), in fact, self-esteem is the highest thing for which one can hope (EIVp52S), being the joy that one feels when one considers oneself and one’s power of acting; it is the ultimate expression of preserving one’s being for no other sake than for oneself (EIVp52S). However, to live selfishly is the height of ignorance for Spinoza (EIVp55), one is to understand oneself within the greater whole, within a community of others. However, to interpret Spinoza’s philosophy as a simple coming together of individuals in pursuit of a common goal, much like a simple aggregate, would be to artificially relieve a contextual tension, as it would likewise be to interpret it as individuals losing themselves within the whole. The tension arises given Spinoza’s commitment for each individual to be interested in preserving his own particular being, and in fact this arises from reason’s dictates, yet at the same time arguing for the social virtues. While the egoistic account certainly does seem to be more closely related to Spinoza’s own account of amicitia given the conatus and the fact that hate and envy are described as our natural dispositions (EIIIp55S), I think it would behoove us to investigate the topic in more depth. To simply reduce amicitia to a kind of enlightened self-interest is to ignore the richness of personal relationship found in Spinozistic philosophy—and in Spinoza’s own life. In light of the inherent tension, I believe that a third conception of friendship, amicitia, will come to the fore—one which will state that only in doing what is good for oneself, will the whole be benefited and vice versa. This has been described above as reciprocity. To draw this third concept out, we must question the relationship that exists between friends. Can a type of friendship exist which is wholly outside of the realm of need? We will see that the answer is clearly no. Examining amicitia in light of need will force us to remember not only that we are finite beings but that we ourselves are needy beings. This will remind us that we are in need of others because of our finite status, but it also reminds us that we are self-concerned precisely because of this finite status. What’s more, need will point out that we are beings of action—that we act as part of our ontological structure. This will be an important component for our consideration of Spinoza’s notion of amicitia. But let us now look to Spinoza’s own words and investigate the status of amicitia for ourselves. If one reads beneath, and behind the surface paying close attention to the references to amicitia, one will notice that Spinoza phrases it quite strangely: “The free man strives to join others to himself in amicitia” (EIIIp59S, EIVp37S1, EIVp70dem) [my emphasis]. There is already a self-interested quality in his discussion of amicitia. The free man, the man who acts from reason, does not phenomenologically commune with others as if they are equals; instead, the Friend is in a very real sense drawn to, and dependent upon the free man. The cleaving process can be explained if we remember that through living in a society one is able to flourish, expressing power, whether this is simple force or expressing one’s Being to its fullest. Through living in this way, the individual places in the Friend a sense of awe and reverence. And to the degree that the individual expresses power, the Friend is drawn to him, through a sense of honor. The feeling of honor and living an honorable life in the face of the Friend, and reciprocating this, will be shown to be of the utmost importance. As such, the Friend is understood as a friend; the Friend is understood to be a ‘friend’ simply because the Friend cleaves himself to the free man. There is a ‘use’ to the Friend. Given Spinoza’s theory of imitation of the affects (EIIIp49S), the cleaving process occurs because the two individuals see themselves as similar. The friend is seen to be a friend simply because the Friend is similar to oneself—for one is only drawn to what one believes to be like oneself. We can infer from the definition of amicitia that the Friend is becoming like the free man, since it is the Friend who is joining the free man in amicitia. This process of cleaving has a two-fold consequence for the free man, representing the sides of friendship presented here in this paper: first, it gives one self-esteem, since the Friend does indeed join one; and secondly, it allows for self-understanding, it draws the individual outside of himself and into the world of the Friend and the Cosmos, revealing to oneself what it is to be human. Hence, we have on the one hand, the self-interested self-esteem; while on the other side we have the self-reflection of what it is to be human via the Friend. By becoming more like oneself, the Friend reveals to oneself how one should treat other human-beings, thus educating us in ethics and giving us a conscience. I will begin a discussion of the former and end with a discussion of the latter culminating in the synthesized view Spinoza has of amicitia. To understand Spinoza’s conception of amicitia, we must first explicate what he means by the term ‘good’ [bonus]. It is only by understanding amicitia in relation to bonus and our motivation for seek after bonus that Spinoza’s narrative on true friendship can be brought into full view and Spinoza’s latent view appreciated. To be good is to have a use (EIVd1). That which is useful, in other words, is a means to a further end. In Spinoza’s own words, “by good I understand every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing” (EIIIp39S) [my emphasis], while what is evil is that which frustrates any particular longing we have. Equating the good with joy gives a different flavor to what is to be understood by useful; opposed to a merely utilitarian view of the good, joy is the passage to a greater perfection/completion (EIII Def. Aff. II). In his discussion of the essence of the mind and its striving [conatus] in EIIIp9S, Spinoza claims that we judge something to be good simply because we strive for it, or because we desire it. Linking this with the discussion in the demonstration concerning striving to persevere in one’s Being, we can interpret this to mean that the good is the striving itself, along with the joy that is felt with the accomplishment of the striving. Insofar as we achieve some kind of goal, we will have a sense of accomplishment. We strive to accomplish goals, and when we succeed, in no matter what we try, we experience joy…when thwarted, we experience sadness. That which is good, that which has a use, then, is to be understood as that which helps us continually to engage in this striving. The good is that which is useful for accomplishing whatever goal we have set before us. What is most important for the present discussion, however, is simply to emphasize that a notion of the good arises from what the individual judges, rightly or wrongly, as that which will help his endeavor to persevere in his being (EIIIp39S). What could be more ‘useful’ for an individual than another individual, the Friend, who is most like himself? Yet, by nature men are inclined to hate and to envy (EIIIp55S), that is to say, by Nature, communities are difficult to obtain, if for no other reason than that individuals are by Nature differently constituted via desire. This, needless to say, gives human-beings an uneasy feeling; their sense self is threatened after all. If an individual can alleviate this perturbed state, perhaps even portraying confidence, the Friend will cleave himself to this individual in hopes of feeling secure as well. Oneself is, then, the object of the Friend’s admiration. In fact by Nature, an individual desires to be the object of joy of the Friend (EIIIp29); thusly if this is achieved and the Friend changes his dispositions according to how oneself lives, one will gain the ultimate sense of accomplishment, self-esteem. Not only will he see himself as benefiting the Friend, and thus becoming the object of his joy, but he will understand himself as the perpetuator of peace (a great accomplishment, no doubt) and thus the protection of both oneself and the Friend—what greater sense of esteem can there be? By acting powerfully, either by force or via a real ethical character, the Friend will join one in amicitia, thus giving one a great sense of self-esteem. And the greater that the Friend is like oneself the more ‘useful’ in this feeling of self-esteem the Friend is, i.e., the Friend will be of greater use, in perpetuating joy. The Friend not only allows the individual to feel a real and authentic sense of accomplishment, but truly does help the individual achieve his own self-preservation. So, there is to a certain extent a sense of utility to our notion of good, but we must understand this ‘utility’ in more detail. And in understanding more fully, we will be privileged to see the synthesis of amicitia. So what does it mean to couch the good in terms of the useful? It must mean that that which is good is good for something. It is good for the sake of something else. It is useful for the completion of some further end. I would like to step back from a strict interpretation of Spinoza for a moment and look to what the consequence for the good is given that it is useful for something else. There is no Good in-and-of-itself. For to be good in-and-of-itself, the Good must be understood as that which would be completely self-sufficient, it would be a complete good, an end in-itself. This type of good would be complete in itself; it itself would need no further completion; it would be perfect [perfectus]. Literally this would mean to be lacking nothing and as such it would be unable to be affected by anything. It would be passionless and as such it cannot be affected with joy or sadness (EVp17), but since good and evil are affects of joy and sadness (EIVp8), there can be no ‘Good’, in the sense of an unqualified and infinite Good. It would itself need nothing; hence, it could in no way be concerned for the human condition. It would have no need for us and our finite concerns. In needing nothing, this ‘Good’ would have no need for accomplishment, no action. There then is no autonomous Good; no infinite Good to which we can look since to be good is to be finite, and finiteness admits the necessity to act within the world. That which is good is good for someone to use for a further end, yet there must be a kind of reciprocity if indeed there can be no Good in-and-of-itself—already we see that amicitia cannot be wholly egoistic. We strive for that which we dub good because it helps us to act, yet if something could not be affected by us, or was affected in a radically different manner than we, it literally would be of no use, it could not help us achieve. It is of no wonder why Spinoza places the good in the finite and in the human realm (EIVp18S and IVp37S1); it is only another human-being who can be useful to another human, since it is only a human who is concerned with the same issues than oneself. That which is most useful therefore is another human who most resembles oneself. Human-beings must ‘use’ each other if for no other reason than that we are finite—we will see that this is the need for reciprocity. By couching the good in terms of the useful, Spinoza has framed and limited his discussion of those for whom the good is good to beings who share in some limitation and lack, such as other human-beings; that is to say, to judge something good, to need the good, is already to be affected by that which is not the good, that is to say, by that which is evil. The greatest evil, indeed the only evil, according to Spinoza is ignorance; just from the fact that we have inadequate knowledge indicates that we always have knowledge of evil (EIVp64C). To have inadequate knowledge indicates that the source of knowledge is something other than oneself and consequently one does not have complete knowledge of it. To be a finite being, then, is to always already be infected with confused and mutilated ideas, that is to say, to be subject to the influence of that which is evil. Not to have knowledge of evil, to have complete knowledge of Being in its presence, would be indicative of being complete and free, acting without impediments (EIVapp.iv). There would be no need for the feeling of joy via accomplishment. Yet, Spinoza delimits human finiteness from the infinite by using the term ‘negation’, and not simply ‘privation’. And since the infinite forces placed over and against us completely overwhelm our finite striving, we are in need of the saving gracing of the good—of the Friend. Since this joyous view of oneself is the striving that one has via the conatus when other individuals have the same strivings as one does, in a sense, they are most useful in fulfilling one’s desired end of self-preservation (EIVp31C and 35C1). (See especially the former note.) Notice too that we are fond of the Friend only insofar as they are like us and therefore of use; the more dissimilar they are, the more we judge them to be bothersome and contrary to our conatus. Thus, in a strange way a friend is not sought out for his own sake; rather the friend is valued only insofar as he is useful to the one who has sought out the friend, and useful in the sense of making oneself more complete, more powerful, and more perfect. Placing this in the context of our discussion of amicitia it would seem, then, that one’s best friend is not the Friend, but rather is oneself—this is emphasized in the conatus as well, where one is primarily concerned about oneself first and foremost. In other words, the good, and the friend, has value because of the presence of evil in our lives, i.e., because we are finite creatures, set over and against the infinitely crushing power of external forces. If we were to leave the story here the friend would be sought out simply for utilitarian and self-interested purposes. Yet, there is however another motivation for seeking amicitia, for that of self-understanding. But self-understanding must be understood in the correct way, i.e., as part of the whole. Although I have presented Spinoza as claiming that there is no good for-its-own-sake, Spinoza does claim that there is a good that is pursued for its own sake, (EIVp25 and p26); so what are we to make of this? This good which Spinoza claims is pursued for its own sake is that of understanding—the first and only foundation of virtue (EIVp26). However, we do not love even understanding for its own sake, but rather we love understanding because it is most useful to us (EIVp27 and p28). So what is this end-for-its-own-sake for which we pursue understanding? It can only be for the sake of oneself—if one pursued knowledge for the sake of another, he would be a flatterer and despondent, a very great vice and a sign of very great ignorance of the self (EIVp55). Each individual is that for-the-sake-of-which each acts. One pursues understanding to understand oneself, all understanding is self-understanding. The ‘self’ that is understood in self-understanding however is not a rarified self, but rather is the understanding itself; the mind is nothing but its own ideas. Thus in a sense, understanding is both for its own sake and for the sake of the self. Understanding too must be understood correctly. Understanding is achieved through those ideas which are adequate; or rather, those ideas which are equally in the part as in the whole. This more than suggests that adequate ideas are adequate in oneself and at the same time adequate in God. But God cannot be some transcend Good to which we look but rather is the Cosmos, and if there is nothing more useful to man than man, this suggests the evil of confused and mutilated ideas is best alleviated through the Friend. Consequently, to have understanding of the self via self-esteem, is to know oneself as God knows oneself—the self is part of the Cosmos, or the whole, which can only come through living in a community. The Friend’s saving grace, as it were, is not only the fact that the Friend becomes more and more like the oneself, thus fulfilling self-esteem’s goal, but also and at the same time, one understands oneself through the Friend. Only by being affected by the Friend can one understand one’s own humanity, since the Friend affects one in a human way. Considering that the human mind neither knows that it itself exists nor that the body exists except through the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected (EIIp19, p22-23), an individual does not know that one exists, nor how (i.e., the quality of one’s existence) but by the manner in which the Friend interacts with oneself. Thus, the saving grace of the Friend is one’s understanding of him so that one can come to a greater understanding of oneself. Let’s look into this topic more. Set over and against such overwhelming circumstances as being finite in an infinite World, would be enough to give anyone angst, foreclosing any chance of happiness, let alone self-esteem. In any case, one would have to view oneself as an infinity small speck that has no significance at all. If this angst were the case, a friendship of utility would be the greatest for which we could hope. This fortunately is not what Spinoza has in mind for his philosophy. His philosophy is one of joy, of life, of what one can accomplish; it is, in short, a philosophy of positive thought. This is why Spinoza has given so much weight to self-esteem. Friendship from any particular paradigm is supposed to bring out the best in both people, however, if the relationship is so one sided that only one flourishes this is no friendship at all, and in fact it will deteriorate into hate and envy. Not only that, but one’s own self-esteem will flounder, thus undercutting the conatus. Instead, both sides of the relationship, the individual and the Friend, must gain in self-esteem. There must be a reciprocity of mutual-self-understanding present within amicitia. But why must this be the case, why does amicitia have to bring out the best in individuals? The answer has already been given, we desire to shine, to impress, and to be held in honor by our friend. In fact, we can “hardly bear a life in disgrace” (EIVp52S). Through honor, through our natural disposition the impress combined with the natural desire of the conatus and the fact that the Friend acts as a kind of mirror to our own most selves, our actions, we desire to do justice in the face of the Friend. Through the mutual-self-understanding a kind of conscience is born. A conscience that is built from reciprocity. Let us delve deep into this topic. Although one feels joy at his own Being through being the adequate cause of the Friend’s actions, one only understands oneself as affecting how the Friend lives in the Friend’s responds to oneself—this is how morality is described by Spinoza; one cannot simply use the Friend as a means to feel good about oneself. This is claim is certainly strengthened through the imitation of affects, which states that however something we believe to be like ourselves is affected so too shall we be, so if the Friend is saddened so too will oneself (EIIIp47), and likewise if the Friend is gladdened so too are we. Self-esteem, then, is a reflection of the self through the Friend as truly benefited. We have seen that the self is nothing but the ideas which make up the mind. I believe this can best be described as the disposition toward which the individual approaches the world. Since this is the self, each individual will be resolved to save this disposition, hence, the Friend living in the manner of oneself has the added advantage of strengthening one’s own disposition to life, and thus strengthening one’s own view of oneself all the more. The more that one’s disposition is increased the more secure one feels, and likewise the less need there is to fear the Friend; the Friend actually becomes to be understood as a mirror into one’s own self through morality; all accomplished through the amount of honor seen in the Friend. If an individual treats the Friend with respect, care and morally, the Friend will joyously join one in amicitia. In joining joyously, the Friend holds he to whom he has cleaved with honor and respect. Hence in sensing this, the individual will strive to do justice to this new found feeling of honor, since it increases his Being. This is something that could be described as a conscience —albeit a conscience founded through the active affects of increasing one’s own Being. When one understands this point, that to harm one’s enemy is in fact to harm oneself, since one will feel a sort of sadness, one begins to appreciate the Friend as a human-being, as an ethical creature. Unless this appreciation occurs one runs the risk of becoming a tyrant. A tyrant is someone who suffers from very great pride, which like despondency, is a very great ignorance of oneself (EIVp55). This ignorance, I believe can best be described as an individual who oversteps his bounds, someone who believes that he is greater than he truly is, perhaps even that he is a complete being. Although, given that human-beings desire more power and are active as part of our natural ontological make up, it seems that we have a naturally tendency toward tyranny, hence hatred and envy are completely natural. Yet, friendship is the only remedy for this natural tendency; hence emphasizing its great importance in Spinoza’s philosophy. Thus the saving grace of the Friend. Amicitia cures this natural tendency toward tyranny precisely when one feels the pain of another whom he has transgressed. He realizes that in order to fulfill his own striving he must benefit the Friend as much as he can. The desire for and condition of self-esteem necessarily highlights that each of us is an incomplete being. By this condition, one is drawn outside of oneself and one’s present state of being and is compelled to increase one’s being by increasing another’s. Thus, understanding conceived in this manner, i.e., as self-knowledge is the impetus for entering into a community with others. However, if we should have a false understanding of the self, a self that is perfect and complete unto itself or even as perfect in a community of others, we will be drawn outside of the community, destroying our essence. This is why Spinoza links understanding, virtue, and power (EIVd8), but how he does so we will have to examine more closely below. Nevertheless, understanding, as virtue, acts as a remedy against the evil into which we find ourselves thrown. Certainly now we can understand how Spinoza can claim that not only is virtue is its own reward, but that understanding is the first and only foundation of virtue. Through a reciprocal friendship with another, one that is not based either in egoism nor in altruism, both individual’s Beings are increased. Simply by acting good toward another, who himself is like minded, will one reap the benefits. This journey to greater power, then, cannot be accomplished by ourselves alone. Each one of us is infinitely inferior to adequately pursue this end. Therefore, if we understand our finite status, we naturally band with other entities in order to search outside of ourselves for wholeness. Yet, not just any other being will do, it must be a being that is most like oneself that will be of most benefit (EIVp30-31). Other human-beings are obviously most like one another, so the bonds of friendship are the most important thing we can endeavor to cultivate (EIVp37S1). We can understand why other humans are most important when we understand that the essential feature of the human mind is adequate knowledge of God (EIVp36S), i.e., of the cosmos, of Being itself. This feature is unique to the human mind alone. Hence, amicitia with other human-beings is necessary for ones own well-being, if by well-‘being’ we mean well-‘Being’. Only in a community can only find self-knowledge. This is why Spinoza claims that the highest thing of which we can have knowledge is not ourselves but of God (EIVp28). This especially makes sense if by God we understand not some transcendent thing, but rather the whole of reality. To understand God is to understand the deeper realities of the world. If one were to only have an ego-centric view of oneself in relation to world, one could not enter into the ethical community, one would understand oneself as existing without limits, thus becoming a tyrant. Let us recap this reciprocal notion of amicitia one last time. True self-knowledge, then, entails not only knowledge of our abilities but likewise our weaknesses, our limitation, our boundaries (EIVp17S and p53Dem); it is knowledge of our finite status along with knowledge that we can be improved, becoming less finite though never anything other than finite. Not only, then, do we require others to tell us that we exist (EIIp19, 22-23), but also how we exist. There seems to be an inherent propensity toward over-estimating one’s abilities, so much so that men are naturally inclined to hate and to envy (EIIIp55S). This is the result acting from pure power without regard for one’s limitation. Yet, through the imitation of the affects and the fact that the affects are based in our nature empathy is built into our very ontological structure (EIIIp19); so if one judges another to be like oneself one will feel pain if they do. One learns that one cannot harm another without oneself feeling the Friend’s pain as well; humans learn ethics in this way. One learns that one cannot act with caprice, but must limit one’s actions to fit the community. And in acting in this way, one learns what it is to be a human-being; one learns one’s humanity and conscience. By EIVp53Dem, we are told that self-knowledge entailing one’s own weaknesses does not suggest that one is saddened by this recognition. Instead, he is filled with joy and his power of acting is aided. How? “The man conceives his lack of power because he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his power of acting.” This last phrase refers to the fact that man understands himself to be held within the bounds of the community, within the bounds of friendship itself. This adequate knowledge of the self is held in relation to others as well. Instead of focusing on the Friend’s weakness, one focuses one’s own strength in relation to the Friend. The more that the Friend truly views oneself as useful, that is, cleaving themselves to one’s own self, can one truly understands one’s power as an adequate power. By filling others with joy, one feels empathic joy from this recognition in the Friend, one understands that these actions are good for the community as a whole. Since the community is benefited, one is benefited as well since not only does he views himself as the cause of this communal benefit, but others do as well. Thus through the experience of self-esteem one realizes what it is to be human, i.e., a social creature. The man acting from reason, then, already understands himself to be part of a greater whole. While self-esteem may be the highest thing we can hope for, it is an esteem of oneself in the context of the community as a whole, and not as an isolated individual. It is recognizing one’s place in the community and finding pride in this relation; it is an esteem of being a good friend. If self-knowledge is both knowledge of one’s strengths as reflected by the praise he receives by benefiting others and knowledge of one’s limitations, the fact that one is necessarily overwhelmed by the power of external forces to which he must conform (shown by the fact that we are pained by doing wrong), then it is reasonable to infer that we hold ourselves ethically to the power of the community within which we find ourselves. This is the power by which one judges one’s own power; if one is a good friend one flourishes, if a bad friend one withers and decays. To gain further insight into one’s own self, then—to fulfill one’s striving from self-concern—one must, by necessity, be truly beneficial to others. To be a good and virtuous individual requires that one have the virtues that make one capable of benefiting others, and in so doing ultimately, then, benefiting oneself. This cannot be accomplished through utility, since we by nature would overstep our ethical boundaries and terrorize the Friend, undercutting friendship. Nor can it be accomplished by being a doormat for the Friend. There must be tension in the sense that honor and respect must be bestowed upon oneself by the Friend. Thus, only a friendship of reciprocity can yield a true friendship. Let us give one final illustration of this picture for the purpose of a review, by stepping back away from Spinoza and attempting to get behind his façade, to show the relationship between the self as being self-concerned and the relational-self, bringing together the two halves of Spinoza’s picture of amicitia. The Friend represents the infinite power of self-perseverance that one strives for—a self-perseverance—that one has only to a very limited extent. We become more perfect through our reasonable interaction with Other—our essence grows because we understand more about ourselves and the world around us; in a sense we learn how to be fully human (we are filled with joy) through our interaction with others in that we learn what we should desire. Thus, we are made more and more aware of the whole. Yet, the whole is incomplete without oneself in that whole. We become aware of our self-advantage through networking with others, yet because the whole is incomplete without oneself our self-advantage is the advantage of the whole, and the whole’s advantage is of oneself—there is a reciprocity between the self and the community. Without self-esteem, without holding oneself as an individual, there could be no recognition that one belongs in the community as an individual with desires and strivings. If this occurs the community may run away with itself with no checks and balances, since no one knows what is good for oneself. But on the other hand, without self-knowledge—knowledge of oneself via the Friend—community no longer is a comm-unity, there would be no unity among its parts. Without the concern for oneself as an individual one would not have the ability truly benefit the Friend, and without this ability one would not have the ability to discover what it is to be a human-being, thus undercutting one’s own self-esteem. This is the complex tripartite structure of amicitia Spinoza has in mind throughout the writing of the Ethics. Bibliography Della Rocca, Michael, Egoism and the Imitation of Affects in Spinoza, “Spinoza on Freedom and the ‘Free Man’” (Fordham University Press: Little Room Press, 2004), 123-148.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Friendship, “Essays and Lectures” (USA: The Library of America, 1983), 340-354.
Goldenbaum, Ursula, The Affects as a Condition of Human Freedom in Spinoza’s Ethics, “Spinoza on Freedom and the ‘Free Man’” (Fordham University Press: Little Room Press, 2004), 149-166.
Lloyd, Genevieve, Spinoza and the Ethics (London: Routledg).