First, a big thanks to Kamille for showing up as a friend, and for letting me show up as hers. A warm fuzzy among the thorns, as the saying will go, or something more poetic.
[Appropriate affectionate gesture here.]
LDE(X) is finally picking up some steam. We got a decent response from Phil's article at Shell-Shocked, and the user community seems to be growing. Good to know that we've created something useful. Phil's all but handed the management of the project over to me; it's a step in an off-the-compass direction, but one to which I'm looking forward. I have a serious lack of crucibles at the moment and my mettle is in need of testing.
I believe I've recovered from my philosophy trauma [slash] shock. kedaman, kedaman, kedaman. I wonder what it's like knowing you. Not that I would want to know you, mind you. Frankly and excrementally, you scare the shit out of me.
Background: moral responsibility. A discussion of it. Frankfurt scenarios and intent. Some movement into modal logic, leading to this conclusion from the Kantian k'man:
We can only be morally responsible for those things we initially intend.
Background, addendum: the situation at hand is a robbery.
k'man's response? If I rob someone to get $200, and in order to get that cash, I have to kill them, then I'm not morally responsible for the murder: only for the theft.
Background, appendix: the situation at hand is driving drunk. The driver wants to get home, that being the intent. In the process (s)he kills a family of five.
k'man? (S)he's morally responsible only for the intent to get home.
Not for the deaths.
Background, glossary: genocide. Rape. Sadistic violation. Nuclear detonation.
k'man: no intent to harm, no foul. We could even go so far as to say that they're good people. The intent is all that matters.
The kedamanian corollary: since these things are not primarily intended, since they are hypothetical and since we have no way to conclusively predict a hypothetical outcome, we (as a society) have no right to punish or intervene.
Why? Because this would be immoral and unjust -- and what matters is justice and morality.
A splendid example, methinks, of the dangers of detachment.
...
Ah, one more thing. Uaral's latest album is good ear immersion. Well worth the relaxation it takes to enjoy it.
[Appropriate affectionate gesture here.]
LDE(X) is finally picking up some steam. We got a decent response from Phil's article at Shell-Shocked, and the user community seems to be growing. Good to know that we've created something useful. Phil's all but handed the management of the project over to me; it's a step in an off-the-compass direction, but one to which I'm looking forward. I have a serious lack of crucibles at the moment and my mettle is in need of testing.
I believe I've recovered from my philosophy trauma [slash] shock. kedaman, kedaman, kedaman. I wonder what it's like knowing you. Not that I would want to know you, mind you. Frankly and excrementally, you scare the shit out of me.
Background: moral responsibility. A discussion of it. Frankfurt scenarios and intent. Some movement into modal logic, leading to this conclusion from the Kantian k'man:
We can only be morally responsible for those things we initially intend.
Background, addendum: the situation at hand is a robbery.
k'man's response? If I rob someone to get $200, and in order to get that cash, I have to kill them, then I'm not morally responsible for the murder: only for the theft.
Background, appendix: the situation at hand is driving drunk. The driver wants to get home, that being the intent. In the process (s)he kills a family of five.
k'man? (S)he's morally responsible only for the intent to get home.
Not for the deaths.
Background, glossary: genocide. Rape. Sadistic violation. Nuclear detonation.
k'man: no intent to harm, no foul. We could even go so far as to say that they're good people. The intent is all that matters.
The kedamanian corollary: since these things are not primarily intended, since they are hypothetical and since we have no way to conclusively predict a hypothetical outcome, we (as a society) have no right to punish or intervene.
Why? Because this would be immoral and unjust -- and what matters is justice and morality.
A splendid example, methinks, of the dangers of detachment.
...
Ah, one more thing. Uaral's latest album is good ear immersion. Well worth the relaxation it takes to enjoy it.