From MSNBC:

Obama's statement on the situation in Georgia:

McCain's statement on the the situation:

The White House spokeswoman Dana Perino issued the following statement:

She also said:

and

In related news, Bush had lunch with Putin today. As of now, it is unclear what the two leaders discussed regarding the outbreak of violence in Georgia. One newspaper is reporting that Putin considers Georgia's skirmishes with Russian forces as an act of war. He reportedly stated:

I can't say that I'm terribly surprised, there has been a strong push throughout Russia to reclaim regions which have a strong Russian minority, as well as recreate their old sphere of influence; see the Ukrainian election of a few years ago which lead to the Orange Revolution within that nation.
Personally, if this goes well for the Russian government and military, I would not be shocked to see them attempt to reclaim parts of Eastern Ukraine, which are heavily ethnically Russian anyway, as well as parts of the Central Asian Republics as well.

surprise or no, i think it's indicative of a bad string of events about to happen. having open warfare and destabilizing yet another part of the world in this day and age is not a good thing. if pro-socialist ideals start to gain power in russia again, we could all be in for a slice of the old shit pie.

I'm not so worried about pro-Socialist ideals as I would a rise in hyper-nationalism.

I wanted to try to give some background information on why each of the factions (Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia) are participating in a conflict, what they hope to get out of it, and why negotiation in the conflict seems so problematic:

During the last years of the Soviet Union, nationalism spread like wildfire and eventually led to the creation of fourteen new states distinct from Russia. Nationalities without their own Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) were denied independence from Moscow when the rest of the republics broke away - as was the case with Chechnya. Moreover, the borders of these states were primarily formulated along the lines of the republics in the USSR. This situation ensured that competing claims to territory was not addressed and the borders of newly independent states were no closer to solving the "Nationalities Question" than the nation-states of Eastern Europe had been in the aftermath of World War I.

Russia, despite its weakness after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was still able to hold on to regions such as Chechnya. Equally important, they were able to continue to exert influence on the newly independent states by encouraging existing ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences in these states. In these conflicts, Russia gambled that both sides would need to rely on Russian patronage in order to resolve their complaints. In other words, Russia treated the former-SSRs as imperialist nations had treated Africa or other former-colonies during the period of decolonization.

South Ossetia is one of those cases. The people of Ossetia enjoyed a favored position in the Soviet Union. When Stalin encouraged the Red Army to "liberate" Georgia in 1921 by reporting to the Bolshevik Party that Georgia was in open proletarian revolution, the population of South Ossetia was one of the few regions that supported the invaders more than they fought them. The Ossetians were given their own autonomous district (oblast' in return and their schools were allowed to operate in Ossetian rather than Georgian.

As the Soviet Union began to fall apart, tensions mounted between Georgians (who wanted independence) and Ossetians (who in many ways had stronger ties to Russia than to Georgia). Ossetians demanded autonomous status within Georgia in 1988 but the central government declared Georgian to be the official language soon thereafter. The central government went even further and declared that regional parties (including those in South Ossetia) were banned. The Ossetians responded by declaring themselves an SSR in their own right - and thus legally distinct from Georgia within the USSR. They held elections on their own and ignored those in the capital.

The real issue for Ossetians seems to be that they believe that their position within Georgian society is lower than their position was before independence. This sentiment rings true when the Georgian government attempts outlaws regional parties, sets Georgian as the official language, and refuses to acknowledge referendums passed in Tskhinvali.

The central government in Tbilisi, for instance, has not considered any Ossetian elections to be valid since 1990. In fact, they even abolished South Ossetia's status as an ASSR in 1990.

In response to this crisis, in 1991 fighting broke out between the two parts of the nation and both sides perpetrated ethnic cleansing against the non-titular population in their territory. In 1992, Georgia had to sign a ceasefire with South Ossetia due to the threat of war with Russia. In that peace, a joint force of Georgians, Ossetians, and Russians were entrusted with peacekeeping duties in South Ossetia. The status quo held until South Ossetia voted on a referendum regarding independence, in which a landslide of ethnic Ossetians favored independence from Tbilisi. This 2006 referendum seems largely prompted by Saakashvili's promises to suppress separatism. No international party besides Russia recognizes the validity of the referendum.

The BBC reports that:

The reasons for the international community ignoring the referendum could be principled and based on the lack of unanimity in desire for independence or the absence of overt oppression. Comments from NATO, however, suggest that the international community desires viable post-Soviet states that won't mirror the Balkans of the 19th or late 20th centuries.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer highlighted the destabilizing effects of the 2006 referendum on independence. He said:

and:

The US has issued direct statements with a similar a priori and unconditional rejection of partitioning Georgia into ethnically distinct subunits.

US Ambassador Julie Finley noted:

Russia retains its interest in the region because the population trades in Russian rubles and uses Russian visas. Likewise, a large portion of Ossetia's money comes in the form of foreign aid from Moscow. Both of these features ensure Ossetian dependency on Russia to function. Russia's national pride has been hurt by their failures in Afghanistan, the fall of the Soviet Union, and their inability to effectively crush Chechen resistance. Putin has also publicly stated that he considers South Ossetia to be the equivalent of Kosovo, suggesting that Russia's refusal to back down plays some role in soothing Russian anger regarding their inability to prevent Kosovo's independence from Serbia.

Putin said:

Finally, Russia knows that policing the region requires Russian involvement. Russia claims to have assisted in the coup against Gamasakhurdia and Shevardnadze requested Russian intervention in suppressing pro-Gamasakhurdia rebels once the former president was removed. In other words, the Kremlin views any heightening of tensions between Caucasian peoples as an opportunity for increasing the dependency of these nations on Russia's military. In the case of the Gamasakhurdia-Shevardnadze conflict, Russia was able to negotiate Georgia's entry in the CIS through their role in peacekeeping. Of course, Russia seems to be a belligerent - and not a peacekeeper - in this current round of conflict, but Russia's strategic goals seem to be grounded in this "intervention leads to dependence" geo-political view of the Caucasus.

Georgia, meanwhile, views Russian participation in peacekeeping as "extremely negative." They also view Ossetia as manipulating poor Russian-Georgian relations to their own ends. Meanwhile, Saakashvili is under popular pressure to make good on his anti-separatist promises and the victory over separatists in Abjara seems to be emboldening Georgian nationalists.

Georgia's viability as a stable state with a functioning economy is hindered by their inability to control breakaway regions such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Meanwhile, they know (or should know) that confidence in the Russian economy will fall if Russia gets locked in a foreign war. With closer ties to the West, Georgia seemed to be willing to risk a brief clash over South Ossetia, hoping that Russia would not escalate the conflict. Finally, the Georgians seem motivated by a desire to maintain territorial integrity, the basic goal of almost any nation-state.

i'm curious what you think russia's real intentions in this conflict are, redbstrd? because you are waaaaaay more knowledgeable about this area than i, and i am pretty damn interested.

This is actually a really informative article. I'm impressed. That doesn't happen often, does it?

Does anyone know South Ossetia's strategic value to Russia? Buffer against the West? Foothold on the southern side of the Caucuses?

The conflict in this region and nearby areas has been simmering at best, and boiling over occasionally, as seen by the warfare that has finally grabbed mainstream attention within the US this week.

Every time I read about current events relating to Russia or articles about it's contemporary history, I further feel the impact of a wide gap in Western & Eastern thought. America's identity, even today, has been greatly influenced by the competing interests of centralized vs. de-centralized authority. When Communism/Socialism swept through Eurasia last century, it seemed to be a similar series of events that began with different ideals & proceeded along a separate course of action.

The more things change....I simply see this as Russia reasserting it's authority as the dominant superpower in the region by participating in skirmishes that it's post-USSR military resources have favorable odds in achieving victory. A nibble here on it's southern borders, perhaps some minor flare-ups in it's western areas once it has gotten it's influence recognized and focused elsewhere. "Repatriation/Liberation" of ethnic Russians and their territories plays upon the hearts of the people, with little spin needed by state-run media sources, and modern Russia's government needs as much domestic support as it can get. It's easier to unite when there is an adversary to use as a scapegoat.

This all being said, I'm far from an expert in any of these matters. I'm just an American who reads newspapers and lets the jumbly bits swirl around my noggin. ^_^

Great article Mr.Bstrd. Very informative.

Thanks

This has been very imformative about a part of the world I've always wanted to know more about.

But is it terrible that I actually kind of miss the days of the Cold War, when an event like this would cause at least twenty or so people in the U.S. government to shit themselves?

...and provide twenty or so people like me a job. Yeah, my nostalgia is kicking in too.

Oh shit!

As I once said to a much missed friend:


It's Hard To Be A Gangsta

Thanks for the informative piece.

yeah, i'm sticking to this thread. the other one is getting too hot too handle.