^ which seems to bring us to the issue - the continued test of wills.

It seems unlikely that this is simply about the 250km of pipeline servicing Caspian oil. One obvious reason for the construction of the pipeline was an effort on the part of west-centric governments (including US sponsorship) to reduce Russia's influence in the area. Interpret that as you may, Russia sees it as US cold war efforts to assert US policy and all it means over Russia. So, Russia is pissed.

Toss in blowhard Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili; a self-described enthusiastic proponent of the strategy to reduce Russia's influence, and you have the beginnings of what might be serious friction. Then of course, Saakashvili has been attempting to play the US by demonstrating support for US principals including the invasion of Iraq while simultaneously looking like your average dictator; clamping down on dissent and efforts by parts of his country to seek independence.

So Saakashvili overplayed his hand because he thought the US would support his efforts to arrogantly poke the bear through the unlocked cage. Not exactly the finesse everyone hoped for and now he seems surprised to have inherited a lap full of Soviet tanks.

More than 2 years ago Putin warned Saakashvili saying, "These people think that under the protection of their foreign sponsors they can feel comfortable and secure," "Is it really so?"

Welcome to the big league Saakashvili, where bluffs are called and the convenience of friendships revealed.

you make it sound as if Chechnya never achieved any level of independence. i see at least as many similarities to Dagestan as to Iraq.

Russia ruled GA for 200 years they see this as a chance to regain some lost ground and to show their former republics that they are still in charge in that sphere. This has less to do with Iraq and far more to do with the West pushing itself up against the borders of Russia, we would not allow the Russians to do this nor the Chinese why would we expect them to allow us to get away with it?

I think Adroitbeing is probably wise in trying to get this back on topic, but I will say that I think a critical difference is that Chechnya never achieved widespread diplomatic recognition. I think that's a pretty critical difference when comparing the invasion of Georgia to the invasions of Chechnya and Dagestan in light of the geopolitical climate set by the Iraq War.

"My president committed troops to an unjstified war in hopes of currying favour with the world's remaining superpower, and all I got was this stupid Russian airstrike"

And it's worth noting that the US used US military transport planes to rush Georgian troops out of Iraq and back to Georgia to face off with the Russians. Bush may have been heard to say..."we're right behind you kid."

too little, too late.

god, i hate bush.

Sorry about the delay in responding, I had a day of celebrating the end of my out-of-state studies, followed by traveling home, and there was no way my girl was going to let me get on the internet when I got back without giving her attention...

As far as Russia's intentions here, I think that they are pushing for Russian dominance (though not outright annexation) of the south Caucasus. They are deeply troubled by the pro-Western orientation of a number of former Soviet states, such as Georgia, the Ukraine, and even Mongolia. Given the chaotic nature of American-Russian intentions, I think that Russia wants to flex its muscles and let its neighbors know that adopting an anti-Russian and pro-Western stance is dangerous.

I also think that Russia is trying to show the public and the international community that it can still win wars (Afghanistan had the same effect on the Russian psyche that Vietnam had on the American public). Moreover, showing that they can win wars in the Caucasus is even more important because it can intimidate Russia's opponents in places like Chechnya as well. I don't think that Russia is pursuing very rational goals but this seems to be motivated by the same concerns that has repeatedly caused Putin to engage in saber-rattling towards the West and economic belligerence towards countries like the Ukraine.

awesome. thanks again for the great article.

Thank you.

I suspect that Russia isn't motivated by strategic concerns too much. I think that they are interested in bolstering their image as a first-rate military power that the international community has to respect and fear. Given American efforts to create missile shield defenses in Eastern Europe, I think that Russia has been looking for an excuse to show off their capability in conventional warfare.

South Ossetia has only minor strategic value as a buffer against the West because it only borders Turkey, who is a NATO member but not really a viable target for Russian intimidation. The United States is interested in friendly relations with Georgia, so Russia may view a Russian-dominated Georgia as a removal of a potential threat.

Historically, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have been points of conflict for Russia and various Middle Eastern powers (Turkey and Iran) in particular, but this only seems relevant if Russia actually wants to annex Georgia. I don't think that they want to do so.

This idea has a few problems. First, we can't lend Georgia planes without training them to use them. Any Russian-Georgian war will be over by then. Second, Georgia can't win this war. They simply don't have the military force to do so. Russia has 20 times the number of troops as Georgia (150,000 versus over 3,000,000). Third, an airforce is only as good as the airfields/aircraft carriers on which it can land. Georgia is simply not capable of defending their airstrips from the Russian armed forces.

If we were to lend/sell/give planes to Georgia, we would only be handing Russia a propaganda victory when the Russian military captured or destroyed them.

Note: Russia sold a lot of arms to Iraq before Iraq was an enemy to America. They continued to sell some gear to Iraq after the Gulf War, but that was not politically motivated. The equipment of the Russian military was available to whomever had the money.

You are right about the Ukrainian issue, but probably not correct about the pipeline in the Caucasus. Oil and natural gases are resources that Russia already has, not resources they are trying to seize.

Russia, of course, doesn't want any pipelines that reduce Russia's ability to control the exportation of oil from Central Asia. Still, capturing the pipeline isn't their goal. Having a dependent Georgian state that would follow Russian policy on oil/gas prices and output is probably a more realistic goal.

this was my exact line of thinking. even though an a-10 is far from a sophisticated next-generation fighter jet (in all honesty, it's pretty much a flying tank), 'loaning' them out would be pretty much the same as crashing them into a mountain.

er, regarding the feasibility of upgrading the Georgian Air Force, that's exactly what we've been doing--NATO, and specifically the US, has been working to modernize the GAF for some time, now. i don't know if just handing them some A-10s is workable in terms of logistics, but as far as pilots go, the Georgians are already experienced with the Su-25, which is basically the Soviet version of the A-10--they're even the same age; the A-10 was first fielded only two years after the Su-25. at this point, admittedly, it'd be throwing away good planes, since the Georgians are rapidly running out of airfields, but if we could get Georgia some A-10s and a place to launch them from, they could probably integrate them into their air force in short order.

the War Nerd has an interesting perspective on the topic of who actually invaded who. not many people are paying attention to the fact that the first real military action was taken by Georgia, on 8 Aug, when they captured Tskhinvali. now, the general consensus on this point has been that Georgia was perfectly within its rights to do so, since Tskhinvali is, technically, just a city in a Georgian province. but that isn't how South Ossetia sees it, and it's actually not how Russia sees it, either: officially, Russia agreed that South Ossetia was a part of Georgia (or, at least, that it wasn't a part of Russia), but unofficially, Russia ran the proto-nation. their troops, their aid money, their puppets ruiling Tskhinvali (fuck, that's hard to spell). which means that when Georgia captured Tskhinvali, they were effectively capturing Russian territory.

and the strong parallels between South Ossetia and Chechnya form another interesting facet. think about it: both, in their prime, were semi-autonomous regions which broke away from their more powerful parent nations, only to later be retaken through military force prompted (supposedly) by their own insurgency.

regardless, whether you view South Ossetia as a spunky loner struggling for freedom or a runaway province that needed to be brought back into line, it's hard to deny that Georgia fired the first shot. they attacked Tskhinvali, which contained a large contingent of Russian troops and a buttload of Russian civilians. the Russian response is certainly disproportionate, but shit--any former Soviet bloc nation that doesn't make at least one land grab per decade gets it membership revoked. the Georgians really should have seen this coming.